Documentation
Every security fix in jQWidgets is documented here with enough technical detail for a customer to assess their own exposure, per the Vulnerability Management Policy. Advisories are listed newest first. Each one states the affected versions as we have determined them, which may be wider than the range in the public CVE record.
To report a vulnerability, see the Security Policy.
| Severity | High - CVSS 3.1 7.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) |
| Weakness | CWE-1321 Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes |
| Affected | Every version before 27.0.0. The public record lists 24.0.1 as the last affected version because that is what the reporter tested; the vulnerable code path was unchanged through 26.0.0. |
| Fixed in | 27.0.0 |
| Component | JQXLite.extend / jqxBaseFramework.extend in jqxcore.js (also present in jqx-all.js and every framework package that bundles the core) |
| Reported | GitHub issue jqwidgets/jQWidgets#764; CVE assigned by VulDB, published 2026-08-24 |
| Published | 2026-09-11 |
Widget options are applied through a deep merge. The merge walked every key of the source object and assigned through target[name]. When the source carried an own "__proto__" key - which is exactly what JSON.parse produces for {"__proto__": {...}} - the assignment resolved through the prototype accessor and wrote onto Object.prototype instead of the target.
Every widget applies its options through this helper, so an application that built widget options from untrusted input reached the vulnerable path without ever calling extend itself. This is the same class of defect as CVE-2019-11358 in jQuery before 3.4.0.
Applications that pass attacker-influenced data into widget options - for example, options assembled from a request body, a URL parameter, a stored user preference or a remote configuration endpoint, and parsed with JSON.parse. Applications whose widget options are authored in code and never derived from external input do not reach the vulnerable path.
The consequence of pollution depends on the application: at minimum, unexpected properties appear on every object; in applications that make security decisions by reading object properties, the effect can be more serious.
The helper now rejects the __proto__ key before the destination object is read, so the key is neither merged nor copied onto the target. The fix is covered by a regression test that loads the source twice - once with the guard stripped out - and asserts that the pollution returns without it, so a future change cannot remove the guard unnoticed.
Strip the key at the point where untrusted JSON enters your application, before it reaches any widget:
const options = JSON.parse(text, (key, value) => key === '__proto__' ? undefined : value);
This is a mitigation, not a substitute for the fix. Upgrade to 27.0.0 or later.
Reported through GitHub issue #764. We thank the reporter. Our current acknowledgement commitment - a human response within three business days, and no report closed without a written reason - postdates this report and applies to every report received since.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-08-24 | CVE-2026-78178 published by VulDB, referencing issue #764 |
| 2026-09-09 | Fix committed with regression test; documented in the 27.0.0 release notes |
| 2026-09-11 | This advisory published |
| 27.0.0 release | Fix available to every supported customer in the same release |